

# A GLOBAL PROTOCOL ON CYBERSECURITY AND CYBERCRIME

## **The Chairman's Model Law for Cybercrime Legislation**

(5th. edition – August 2009)

### SUMMARY

Even if the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (2001) or the principles and standards it contains are accepted, the discussions at the global High Level Experts Group (HLEG) meetings and the recommendations in the Chairman's Report have revealed that to most other global regions it still is a European convention. It is in other words necessary within a global framework to recommend the accepted standards and principles in the Convention, with certain important exceptions.

The most important problem today is that the 2001 Cybercrime Convention, like other treaties, is not dynamic. The Convention is based on criminal cyber conducts in the late 1990s. New methods of conducts in cyberspace with criminal intent must be covered by criminal law, such as phishing, botnets, spam, identity theft, virtual world offences, terrorist use of Internet, and massive and coordinated cyber attacks against critical information infrastructures etc. Many countries have adopted or preparing for new laws covering some of those conducts. In addition, the terminology included in the Convention is a 1990s terminology, and do not necessary be suitable for the 2010s.

STEIN SCHJOLBERG  
Chief Judge<sup>1</sup>

Norway

HLEG Chairman

(2007-2008)

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<sup>1</sup> See [www.cybercrimelaw.net](http://www.cybercrimelaw.net)  
[stein.schjolberg@cybercrimelaw.net](mailto:stein.schjolberg@cybercrimelaw.net)

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Cyberspace is one of the great legal frontiers of our time. From 2000 to 2009, the Internet has expanded at an average rate of 362 % on a global level, and currently an estimated 1,6 billion people are “on the Net.”<sup>2</sup> The increase in Asia has been 516% and in Africa 1,359%.

The rapid growth of the information and communication technology (ICTs) networks has created new opportunities for criminals in perpetrating crime, and to exploit online vulnerabilities and attack countries’ critical information infrastructure. Government institutions, private industry, and individuals are increasingly reliant on the information stored and transmitted over ICTs. The costs associated with cybercrime and cyberattacks are significant – in terms of lost revenues, loss of sensitive data, and damage to equipment. The future growth and potential of the online information society are in danger from growing cyberthreats. Furthermore, cyberspace is borderless: cyberattacks can inflict immeasurable damage in different countries in a matter of minutes. Cyberthreats are a global problem and they need a global harmonization,<sup>3</sup> involving all stakeholders.

Cybersecurity and cybercrime, including massive and coordinated cyber attacks against countries critical information infrastructure, and terrorist use or misuse of Internet, are cyberthreats of critical concerns to the global society.

In order to reach for a common understanding of cybersecurity and cybercrime among countries at all stages of economic development, a global agreement or Protocol at the United Nations level may be established that includes solutions aimed at addressing the global challenges. A Protocol may promote peace and security in cyberspace, including legal frameworks that are globally applicable and interoperable with the existing national and regional legislative measures.

## 2. THE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT

The UN General Assembly recognized in 2001 the need for a multi-phase World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and asked the ITU to take a lead role in coordinating robust, multi-stakeholder participation in these events. Phase one of WSIS occurred in Geneva in December 2003, and Phase two took place in Tunisia in 2005.

The strategies for the development of a model cybercrime legislation that is globally applicable and interoperable with existing national and regional legislative measures, may follow the goals adopted by the 2005 Tunis Agenda of WSIS paragraph 42 and 40:

*“We affirm that measures undertaken to ensure Internet stability and security, to fight cybercrime and to counter spam, must protect and respect the provisions for privacy and freedom of expression as contained in the relevant parts of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Declaration of Principles.” (Paragraph 42)*

*“We call upon governments in cooperation with other stakeholders to develop necessary legislation for the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime, noting existing frameworks, for example, UNGA Resolutions 55/63 and 56/121 on “Combating the criminal misuse of information technologies” and regional initiatives including, but not limited to, the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime.” (Paragraph 40)*

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<sup>2</sup> See World Internet Usage and Population Statistics, <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm> (June 30, 2009).

<sup>3</sup> See Stein Schjolberg and Amanda M. Hubbard: Harmonizing National Legal Approaches on Cybercrime (2005), [www.itu.int/cybersecurity/gateway/laws\\_legislation.html](http://www.itu.int/cybersecurity/gateway/laws_legislation.html)

Following the WSIS summits and the 2006 ITU Plenipotentiary Conference, ITU assumed an important role in coordinating to build confidence and security in the use of ICTs.

The ITU Secretary-General Dr. Hamadoun I. Toure, launched in May 2007 the Global Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA) for a framework where the international response to the growing challenges to cybersecurity could be coordinated.

In order to assist the ITU's Secretary-General in developing strategic proposals to Member States, a High Level Experts Group (HLEG) was established in October 2007. This global expert group of more than 100 experts delivered Reports and Recommendations in June 2008. The Chairman's Report was published in August 2008. The Global Strategic Report was published on November 12, 2008, including strategies in the following five work areas: Legal Measures, Technical and Procedural Measures, Organizational Structures, Capacity Building, and International Cooperation.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See [www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/global\\_strategic\\_report/index.html](http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/global_strategic_report/index.html)

### 3. A GLOBAL PROTOCOL ON CYBERSECURITY AND CYBERCRIME

Most member countries have signed, ratified or acceded to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime of 2001. But the Convention has not reached the similar level of acceptance in other regions and countries. Even if the Convention or the principles and standards it contains are accepted, the discussions at the HLEG meetings and the recommendations in the Chairmans Report have revealed that to most other global regions it still is and always will be a European convention. It is in other words necessary within a global framework to recommend the accepted standards and principles in the Convention, with certain important exceptions.

With regard to the exceptions, it must be emphasized that Russia will not make a signature to the Convention due to the existence of Article 32: Trans-border access to stored computer data with consent or where publicly available. Many HLEG members found it necessary to make it clear that the Convention was only an example of a regional initiative, and this was included in the recommendations. It was also made clear that many countries preferred only making use of the Convention as a reference, and nothing more. To these countries, the implementation of standards and principles in the convention had to be in accordance with their Criminal Law traditions.

## CHAPTER 1

### Article 1: Measures in Substantive Criminal Law

Considering the Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime as an example of legal measures realized as a regional initiative, countries should complete its ratification, or consider the possibility of acceding to the Convention of Cybercrime. Other countries should, or may want to, use the Convention as a guideline, or as a reference for developing their internal legislation, by implementing the standards and principles it contains, in accordance with their own legal system and practice. It is very important to implement at least Articles 2-9 in the substantive criminal law section.

Countries should especially consider legislation measures against spam, identity theft, criminalization of preparatory acts prior to attempted acts, and massive and coordinated cyber attacks against the operation of critical information infrastructure.

Extending the application of existing provisions may cover criminal activities related to online games. Otherwise, countries should consider an appropriate approach to cover such offences, including a new legal framework for activities in virtual worlds.

### Article 2: Measures in Procedural Law: Investigation and Prosecution

Countries should establish the procedural tools necessary to investigate and prosecute cybercrime, as described in the Convention on Cybercrime Articles 14-22 in the section on procedural law.

The implementation of a data retention approach is one approach to avoid the difficulties of getting access to traffic data before they are deleted, and countries should carefully consider adopting such procedural legislation.

Voice over Internet Protocols (VoIP) and other new technologies may be a challenge for law enforcement in the future. It is important that law enforcement, government, the VoIP industry and ICT community consider ways to work together to ensure that law enforcement has the tools it needs to protect the public from criminal activity.

Given the ever-changing nature of ICTs, it is challenging for law enforcement in most parts of the world to keep up with criminals in their constant efforts to exploit technology for personal and illegal gains. With this in mind, it is critical that the police work closely with government and other elements of the criminal justice system, Interpol and other international organizations, the public at large, the private sector and non-governmental organizations to ensure the most comprehensive approach to addressing the problem.

International coordination and cooperation are necessary in prosecuting cybercrime and require innovation by international organizations and governments. The Convention on Cybercrime Articles 23-25 address basic requirements for international cooperation in cybercrime cases.

### Article 3: Measures against Terrorist misuse or use of Internet

In the fight against terrorist misuse of the Internet and related ICTs, countries should complete their ratification of the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism of 2005. Other countries should, or may want to, use the Convention as a guideline, or as a reference for developing their internal legislation, by implementing the standards and principles it contains, in accordance with their own legal system and practice. Article 5 on public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, Article 6 on recruitment for terrorism, and Article 7 on training for terrorism are especially important. In

addition, the Convention on Cybercrime has been found to be important for defense against terrorist misuse of the Internet.

#### Article 4: Measures for the Global Cooperation and Exchange of Information

A global conference on cybersecurity and cybercrime should be organized with the participation of regional and international organizations, together with relevant private companies. Participating organizations includes, but are not limited to: ITU, INTERPOL, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), G 8 Group of States, Council of Europe, Organization of American States (OAS), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), The Arab League, The African Union, The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), The Commonwealth, European Union, Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), NATO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

#### Article 5: Measures on Privacy and Human Rights

In conducting cybercrime investigation and prosecution, countries should ensure that their procedural elements include measures that preserve the fundamental rights to privacy and human rights, consistent with their obligations under international human rights law. Preventive measures, investigation, prosecution and trial must be based on the rule of law, and be under judicial control.

#### Article 6: Measures in Civil Law

Given the responsibility of government authorities in protecting their consumers, special attention should be given to requirements enacted by government authorities that bear directly on the infrastructure-based and operational requirements imposed on those who provide and operate network infrastructures and services, or supply the equipment and software, or end-users. The concept of shared responsibilities and responsible partnership should be underscored in the development of legal measures on cybersecurity obligations in civil matters. A coordinated approach between all parties is necessary to develop agreements, as well as provide civil remedies in the form of judicial orders for action or monetary compensation instituted by legal systems when harm occurs.

#### Chapter 2: Technical and Procedural Measures

Key measures for addressing vulnerabilities in software products, including accreditation schemes, protocols and standards.

#### Chapter 3: Organizational Structures

The prevention, detection, response to, and crisis management of cyberattacks, including the protection of countries' critical information infrastructure systems.

#### Chapter 4: Capacity Building

Capacity-building mechanisms to raise awareness, transfer know-how and boost cybersecurity on the national policy agenda.

#### Chapter 5: International Cooperation

International cooperation, dialogue and coordination in dealing with cyberthreats.

## EXPLANATORY REPORT

### Commentary on the Articles:

#### Article 1

1) The 2001 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime is a historic milestone in the combat against cyber crime, and entered into force on July 1, 2004. The total number of signatures not followed by ratifications are 20, and 26 States have ratified the Convention.<sup>5</sup>

By ratifying or acceding to the Convention, the States agree to ensure that their domestic laws criminalize the conducts described in the substantive criminal law section. Other States should evaluate the advisability of implementing the standards and principles of the Convention and use the Convention as a guideline, or as a reference for developing their internal legislation

In order to establish criminal offences for the protection of information and communication in Cyberspace, provisions must be enacted with as much clarity and specificity as possible, and not rely on vague interpretations in the existing laws. When cybercrime laws are adopted, perpetrators will be convicted for their explicit acts and not by existing provisions stretched in the interpretations, or by provisions enacted for other purposes covering only incidental or peripheral acts.

One of the most important purposes in criminal legislation is the prevention of criminal offenses. A potential perpetrator must also in cyberspace have a clear warning with adequate foreseeability that certain offences are not tolerated. And when criminal offences occur, perpetrators must be convicted for the crime explicitly done, satisfactorily efficient in order to deter him or her, and others from such crime. These basic principles are also valid for cybercrimes.

2) Articles 2-9 on substantive criminal law in the Convention covers illegal access, illegal interception, data interference, system interference, misuse of devices, computer-related forgery, computer-related fraud and offences related to child pornography. Many countries, especially in Asia, do not have traditions on copyright legislations such as covered by Article 10 on Offences related to infringements of copyright and related rights. That makes it not naturally to include this principle in a global Protocol for recommendations of measures to be implemented.

With regard to Article 9 on offences related to child pornography, many international organizations<sup>6</sup> are engaged in the fight against online child pornography.<sup>7</sup> It includes the 1989 UN Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography<sup>8</sup>; the 2003 EU Council Framework Decision on combating the sexual

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<sup>5</sup> See [conventions.coe.int](http://conventions.coe.int) (March 2009)

<sup>6</sup> See Marco Gercke: ITU Global Strategic Report 1.6.2.1, page 34

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, the “G8 Communique”, Genoa Summit, 2001, available at: <http://www.g8.gc.ca/genoa/july-22-01-1-e.asp>.

<sup>8</sup> UN Convention on the Right of the Child, A/RES/44/25 – available at: <http://www.hrweb.org/legal/child.html>.

exploitation of children and child pornography<sup>9</sup>; and the 2007 Council of Europe Convention on the protection of children against sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, among others.<sup>10</sup>

The discussions at the HLEG meetings made it clear that the members wanted the principles against child pornography to be included.

### 3) Phishing and other preparatory acts.

The most important problem is that the 2001 Cybercrime Convention, like other treaties, is not dynamic. The Convention is based on criminal cyber conducts in the late 1990ties. The only supplement has been expanding the technical definitions in 2006 and 2007.

New methods of conducts in cyberspace with criminal intent must be covered by criminal law, such as phishing, botnets, spam and identity theft. Many countries have adopted or preparing for new laws covering some of those conducts.

One of the phishing methods is sending of e-mail messages, falsely claiming or pretending to be from a legitimate organization or company. The victim may also be lured to counterfeit or fake Web sites that look identical to the legitimate web sites maintained by banks, insurance company, or a government agency. The e-mails or websites are designed to impersonate well known institutions, very often using spam techniques in order to appear to be legal. Company logos and identification information, web site text and graphics are copied, thus making the conducts possible criminal conducts as forgeries or frauds.

The perpetrator may send out e-mail to consumers leading them to believe that the e-mail was actually from a legitimate company. The sender may appear to be from the “billing center” or “account department”. The text may often contain a warning that if the consumer did not respond, the account would be cancelled. A link in the e-mail may take the victim to what appeared to be the Billing Center, with a logo and live links to real company web sites. The victim may then be lured to provide the phisher with “updated” personal and financial information, that later will be used to fraudulently obtain money, goods or services. Such cases may cost Internet service providers a millions dollar to detect and combat the phishing scheme.

When phishing are carried out through spamming it may be a criminal conduct as a violation of special anti spam legislations.

Phishing may be achieved by deceiving the victim into unwittingly download malicious software onto the system that can allow the perpetrator subsequent access to the computer and the victims personal and financial information. Such category of phishing may be carried out through the use of botnets. It is estimated that at least 80% of phishing incidents are carried out through botnets. The individual access is normally considered as illegal access to computer systems and illegally obtaining information. The botnets may include thousands of compromised computers, and are produced and offered on the marked to criminals for sale or lease.

The perpetrator may also purchase, sell or transfer the illegally obtained information to other criminals. The trafficking of stolen personal or financial information could be provided to third parties through a web site or a closed web forum and will use it to obtain money, credit goods and

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9 Council Framework Decision on combating the sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, 2004/68/JHA, available at: [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/l\\_013/l\\_01320040120en00440048.pdf](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/l_013/l_01320040120en00440048.pdf).

10 Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, CETS No: 201, available at: <http://conventions.coe.int>.



offence, especially if the information is illegally obtained access codes. In other cases it may not be covered by criminal codes.

#### 4) Preparatory acts;

Criminal laws on cybercrime may also cover preparatory conducts to traditional cybercrime provisions, by establishing the acts as independent separate statutes.

In China, the Penal Code section 22 on preparatory crime, make the following acts a criminal offence:

- Preparation of tools to commit a crime
- Creation of conditions to commit a crime

In Sweden, an Article on preparatory acts was adopted on July 1, 2001, in conjunction with other amendments in the Penal Code. It was especially emphasized that the introduction of a specific Article on preparatory acts was directed not only at ordinary crimes, but also at the problems with computer virus and other computer programs that solely was created for the purpose to obtain illegal access to data or other computer crime. The Article includes:

*“any involvement with something that is especially suitable to be used as a tool for a crime”*

A provision on preparatory acts may be found in the Convention on Cybercrime Article 6, but may also be as follows:

*“The production, obtaining, possession, sale or otherwise making available for another, computer programs and data especially suitable as a tool for criminal conducts in a computer system or network, when committed intentionally, shall be punished as a preparatory act to criminal offences.”*

Another alternative may be expanding the traditional concept of *“attempting to commit an offence”* to include all categories of intentional preparatory acts.

#### 5) Identity theft

The purpose of identity theft is fundamentally, the misuse of personal information belonging to another to commit fraud. The loss or theft of the information itself does not ordinarily constitute a criminal offence. But it may, as a preparatory conduct or the perpetrator is attempting an identity theft. Some countries use the term *“identity theft”* when perpetrators obtains, often thousands of credit and debit card numbers, social security numbers, and other personal identification information. The new Penal Code in Norway (2009) avoids the term *“theft”*, using a substitution such as *“identity infringement”*.

The crime itself was known before computers were around, but through the use of information and communication technology, it has turned into a very nasty business.

Millions of people around the world suffer the financial and emotional trauma of identity theft. In most countries, no legislation exists covering the phishing by itself or as identity theft.

One exception is the United States, where federal legislation and almost all states have adopted laws on identity theft that may also be applied against criminal conducts through computer systems.

The main section is US Penal Code § 1028. This section criminalizes eight categories of conduct involving fraudulent identification documents or the unlawful use of identification information. § 1028 (a)(7) was adopted in 1998, amended in 2004 and reads as follows:

*“Whoever, in a circumstance described in subsection (c) of this section-*

*(7) knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, or in connection with, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a felony under any applicable, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.*

The term “means of identification” is defined as “any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual. The section will apply to both online and manual crime cases, and may be a model law for other countries now facing special laws on identity theft. Aggravated Identity Theft was established in § 1028A as a new offence in 2004. § 1028A adds an additional two-year term of imprisonment whenever a perpetrator knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person during and in relation to any felony violation of certain federal offences.

In Europe, the new Norwegian Penal Code (2009) has in § 202 a provision on Identity Infringements that reads as follows:

*“With a fine or imprisonment not exceeding 2 years shall whoever be punished, that without authority possesses of a means of identity of another, or acts with the identity of another or with an identity that easily may be confused with the identity of another person, with the intent of*

*a) procuring an economic benefit for oneself or for another person, or*

*b) causing a loss of property or inconvenience to another person.”*

## 6) Spam

The term “spam” is commonly used to describe unsolicited electronic bulk communications over e-mail or mobile messaging (SMS, MMS), usually with the objective of marketing commercial products or services. While this description covers most kinds of spam, a growing phenomenon is the use of spam to support fraudulent and criminal activities – including attempts to capture financial information (e.g. account numbers and passwords) by masquerading messages as originating from trusted companies (phishing) – and as a vehicle to spread viruses and worms. On mobile networks, a particular problem is the sending of bulk unsolicited text messages with the aim of generating traffic to premium-rate numbers.

Such conducts may be a criminal offence. An example is the US CAN-SPAM Act of 2003: U.S.C. § 1037. This section criminalizes serious violations, such as where the perpetrator has taken significant steps to hide his identity or the source of the spam, to the receivers, ISP’s or law enforcement agencies.

Among the conducts, section § 1037 (a) includes:

*“materially falsifies header information in multiple commercial electronic mail messages and intentionally initiates the transmission of such messages.”*

The Convention on Cybercrime does not include a provision on spam, only in cases of serious and intentional hindering of communication<sup>11</sup> or unlawful interference with computer networks and

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<sup>11</sup> Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime No. 69: “The sending of unsolicited email, for commercial or other purposes, may cause nuisance to its recipient, in particular when such messages are sent in large quantities or with a high frequency (“spamming”). In the opinion of the drafters, such conduct should only be criminalised where the communication is intentionally and seriously hindered. Nevertheless, Parties may have a different approach to hindrance under their law, e.g. by making particular acts of interference administrative offences or otherwise subject to sanction. The text leaves it to the Parties to determine the extent to which the functioning of the system should be hindered – partially or totally, temporarily or permanently – to reach the threshold of harm that justifies sanction, administrative or criminal, under their law.”

systems. Spam is thus covered as a criminal offence in the Convention in cases where the amount of spam has a serious influence on the processing power of computer systems, and not when the effectiveness of commerce have been influenced, but not necessarily the computer system.<sup>12</sup>

#### 7). Crime in the Virtual World

Online games<sup>13</sup> such as “Second Life” are virtual worlds. “Second Life” is developed by Linden Lab and launched in 2003. Registered users called residents interact with other residents through “avatars”. An “avatar” is a virtual 3D-character that exists in the virtual world and interacts with other “avatars” like a mirror of human beings behaviours and allowed to build virtual objects with defined economic values. Virtual currency supports commerce that offers virtual objects for sale. Exchanging the virtual currency to real-world currency is also established.

Most offences in the virtual world may be covered by existing provisions in the real worlds criminal legislation. Unlawful obtaining virtual objects may be covered by forgery as manipulation of information, or covered by illegal interference with data as described in the Convention on Cybercrime Article 4. Copyright laws may also be applicable.

#### Article 2

The standards and principles on procedural law in Articles 14-25 of the Convention are commonly accepted as necessary measures for an efficient investigation<sup>14</sup> and prosecution of criminal conducts in cyberspace, both nationally and in a global perspective.

Adopting procedural laws necessary to establish powers and procedures for the prosecution of criminal conducts against ICTs are essential for a global investigation and prosecution of cybercrime. But such powers and procedures are also necessary for the prosecution of other criminal offences committed by means of a computer system, and should apply on the collection of evidence in electronic form of all criminal offences. (Article 14)

The real-time collection and recording of traffic data, interception of content data, data retention, and the use of key-loggers, are among challenges that constitute discussions today. Legal measures on these issues must increasingly be evaluated especially against privacy rights. A special problem has been caused by Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP). The old methods of recording vocal human voices are no longer possible.

#### 1) Voice over IP<sup>15</sup>

Voice over Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) is a term for transmission technologies for delivery of voice communications over IP networks, such as for instance the Internet. Other terms synonymous with VoIP, are IP telephony or Internet telephony. The purpose of implementing VoIP may be reducing costs by routing phone calls over existing data networks in order to avoid separate voice and data networks, or make the phone calls less accessible to other persons. Only an Internet connection is needed to get a connection to a VoIP provider. VoIP may also integrate with other services available over the Internet, such as video conferences. Anyone with a broadband connection can subscribe to

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<sup>12</sup> See Marco Gercke: ITU Global Strategic Report 1.6.2.3, page 37 (2008)

<sup>13</sup> See Marco Gercke: ITU Global Strategic Report 1.6.2.4, page 37 (2008)

<sup>14</sup> See Marc Goodman: ITU Global Strategy Report 1.8, page 51 (2008). This chapter contains a detailed and comprehensive presentation of the challenges for law enforcement

<sup>15</sup> See Graham Butler: ITU Global Strategic Report 1.7.8, page 48 (2008)

a VoIP provider and make phone calls to anywhere in the world at rates far below those of an incumbent provider.

But when using the IP networks in the same manner as other data, the system is as always vulnerable to unauthorized access or attacks. This includes that hackers knowing the vulnerabilities, may for instance establish DoS attacks, obtain data, and record communications and conversations.

A serious public safety issue is lawful intercept, and law enforcement's surveillance capabilities, an issue that is being encountered around the world, as criminals and terrorists flock to VoIP as a way to have secured communications away from law enforcements ability to track and trace them. Even when law enforcement has the means to track a call, encryption schemes for data are making it more difficult for law enforcement to conduct surveillance. Although surveillance may be allowed by courts, encryption means law enforcement may not be able to listen to VoIP calls the way they can in the circuit-switched world. Without the ability to require VoIP operators to decrypt, law enforcement agencies won't be able to hear a terrorist say, 'We're going to bomb the courthouse tomorrow morning' and prevent the attack. Instead, they'll be limited to using the intercepted transmission to make an arrest when they finally decrypt it weeks after the event. Clearly, government and VoIP industry must work together to ensure that law enforcement has the tools it needs to protect the public from criminal activity.<sup>16</sup>

## 2) Use of key logger and other software tools<sup>17</sup>

Keystroke logging or keylogging may be used for capturing and recording the user keystrokes. Both law enforcement and criminals may use this methods to study how the users interact and access with computer systems, or providing means to obtain passwords or encryption keys. Such methods may enable the law enforcement to remotely access the computer of the suspect and as a trojan search for information. As measures for law enforcement, these methods are widely discussed.<sup>18</sup> The term "remote forensic software" is often used by law enforcement on the methods of transmitting data out of the target computer, or carry out remote search procedures, or the recording of Voice over IP (VoIP) services. But a trojan that transmits data may also risk of exposing the attacker.

## 3) Data retention<sup>19</sup>

Data retention refers to the storage of Internet traffic and transaction data, usually of telecommunications, emails, and websites visited. The purpose for data retention is traffic data analysis and mass surveillance of data,<sup>20</sup> in order to avoid problems of getting access to traffic data before they are deleted.

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<sup>16</sup> See Graham Butler: ITU Global Strategic Report 1.7.8, page 48 (2008)

<sup>17</sup> See Marco Gercke: ITU Global Strategic Report 1.7.9, page 49 (2008)

<sup>18</sup> Regarding the plans of German law enforcement agencies to develop a software to remotely access a suspects computer and perform search procedures see: Blau, Debate rages over German government spyware plan, 05.09.2007, Computerworld Security – available at: <http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9034459>; Broache, Germany wants to sic spyware on terror suspects, 31.08.2007, CNet News – available at: [http://www.news.com/8301-10784\\_3-9769886-7.html](http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3-9769886-7.html).

<sup>19</sup> See Marco Gercke: ITU Global Strategic Report 1.7.10, page 49 (2008)

<sup>20</sup> For an introduction to data retention see: Breyer, Telecommunications Data Retention and Human Rights: The Compatibility of Blanket Traffic Data Retention with the ECHR, European Law Journal, 2005, page 365 et. seqq; Blanchette/Johnson, Data retention and the panoptic society: The social benefits of forgetfulness – available at: <http://polaris.gseis.ucla.edu/blanchette/papers/is.pdf>.

The European Union adopted in 2006 a Directive on the retention of data.<sup>21</sup> The data must be available to law enforcement for the purpose of the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime, as defined by each Member State. The Directive requires that communications providers must retain, for a period of between six months and two years, necessary data as specified in the Directive in order

- to trace and identify the source of a communication
- to trace and identify the destination of a communication
- to identify the date, time and duration of a communication
- to identify the type of communication
- to identify the communication device
- to identify the location of mobile communication equipment

Human rights organizations have strongly objected to the Directive on data retention.<sup>22</sup>

### Article 3

#### 1) Introduction

Terrorism has been used to describe criminal conducts long before the computer communication and network technology was introduced. International organizations have been involved in the prevention of such acts for a long period, but the global society has not yet been able to agree upon a universal definition on terrorism. In the final conference on preparing for the establishment of an international criminal court,<sup>23</sup> other serious crimes such as terrorism were discussed, but the conference regretted that no generally acceptable definition could be agreed upon.

In Europe a Council of Europe treaty “The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism” was adopted in 1977 as a multilateral treaty. The treaty was in 2005 supplemented by the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism.<sup>24</sup> In this convention a terrorist offence is merely defined as meaning any of the offences as defined in an attached list of 10 treaties in the Appendix. But the purpose or intent of a terrorism offence is described in the convention as:

*by their nature or context to seriously intimidate a population or unduly compel a government or an international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act or seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization.*

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<sup>21</sup> Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC.

<sup>22</sup> See for example: Briefing for the Members of the European Parliament on Data Retention – available at: <http://www.edri.org/docs/retentionletterformeps.pdf>; CMBA, Position on Data retention: GILC, Opposition to data retention continues to grow – available at: [http://www.vibe.at/aktionen/200205/data\\_retention\\_30may2002.pdf](http://www.vibe.at/aktionen/200205/data_retention_30may2002.pdf); Regarding the concerns related to a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights see: Breyer, Telecommunications Data Retention and Human Rights: The Compatibility of Blanket Traffic Data Retention with the ECHR, European Law Journal, 2005, page 365 et. seqq.

<sup>23</sup> Final Act of the United Nations diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome July 17, 1998 (U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10)

<sup>24</sup> The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism will enter into force June 1, 2007.

Terrorism in cyberspace consists of both cybercrime and terrorism. Terrorist attacks in cyberspace are a category of cybercrime and a criminal misuse of information technologies.<sup>25</sup> The term “cyberterrorism” is often used to describe this phenomenon.<sup>26</sup> But while using such term, it is essential to understand that this is not a new category of crime.

Cyberterrorism has been defined as unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, networks, and stored information. It has to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives. An attack should result in violence against persons or property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear. Serious attacks against critical infrastructures could be acts of cyberterrorism, depending on their impact.<sup>27</sup>

Another definition covers a criminal act perpetrated by the use of computers and telecommunications capabilities causing violence, destruction and/or disruption of services. The purpose must be to create fear by causing confusion and uncertainty in a population, with the goal of influencing a government or population to conform to a particular political, social or ideological agenda.<sup>28</sup>

Cyberterrorism has also been defined as attacks or series of attacks on critical information infrastructures carried out by terrorists, and instills fear by effects that are destructive or disruptive, and has a political, religious, or ideological motivation.<sup>29</sup>

These definitions have one thing in common, the conducts must be acts designed to spread public fear, and must be made by terrorist intent or motivation. Terrorism in cyberspace includes the use of information technology systems that is designed or intended to destroy or seriously disrupt critical information infrastructure of vital importance to the society and that these elements also are the targets of the attack.<sup>30</sup>

The developments in computer systems and networks have also blurred the differences between cybercrime and cyberterrorism.<sup>31</sup> The massive and coordinated attacks in Estonia in April – May 2007 have clearly demonstrated the need for implementing such principles. The principles for protecting critical information protection may as such be a part of the society’s protection against cybercrime and cyberterrorism. And a part of the national security strategies.

## 2) Conducts of terrorism in cyberspace

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<sup>25</sup> See ASEAN Regional Forum Statement on cooperation in fighting cyber attack and terrorist misuse of cyberspace (June 2006)

<sup>26</sup> John Malcolm, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, US Department of Justice: Virtual Threat, Real Terror: Cyberterrorism in the 21st Century; Testimony before the US Senate Committee on the Judiciary, February 24, 2004.

<sup>27</sup> Dorothy E. Denning, Professor, Naval Postgraduate School, USA: Testimony before the Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, May 2000.

<sup>28</sup> Keith Lourdeau, Deputy Assistant Director, Cyber Division, FBI: Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security. Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee, February 24, 2004.

<sup>29</sup> See the International Handbook on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) 2006 Vol. II, page 14

<sup>30</sup> See also Kathryn Kerr, Australia: Putting cyberterrorism into context. (2003)

<sup>31</sup> Clay Wilson: CRS Report for Congress – Botnets, Cybercrime, and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress (November 2007)

Serious hindering or destruction of the functioning of a computer systems and networks of the critical information infrastructure of a State or government would be the most likely targets. Attacks against critical information infrastructures may cause comprehensive disturbance and represent a significant threat that may have the most serious consequences to the society.

Potential targets may be governmental systems and networks, telecommunications networks, navigation systems for shipping and air traffic, water control systems, energy systems, and financial systems, or other functions of vital importance to the society. It should constitute a criminal offence when terrorists are able of hindering or interrupting the proper functioning, or influence the activity of the computer system, or making the system inoperative e.g. crashing the system. Computer systems can thus be closed down for a short or extended period of time, or the system may also process computer data at a slower speed, or run out of memory, or process incorrectly, or to omit correct processing. It does not matter if the hindering being temporarily or permanent, or partial or total.

The most potential attacks by terrorists in cyberspace are flooding computer systems and networks with millions of messages from networks of hundreds of thousands of compromised computers from all over the world in a coordinated cyberattack. Such an attack has a potential to crash or disrupt a significant part of a national information infrastructure.

### 3) Preparatory criminal conducts in terrorism

According to the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, Articles 5-7, the parties to the Convention are required to adopt certain preparatory conducts that have a potential to lead to terrorist acts, as criminal offences.<sup>32</sup>

Public provocation to commit a terrorist offence is a criminal offence if the distribution of a message to the public, “whether or not directly advocating terrorist offences, causes a danger that one or more such offences may be committed” (Article 5). Presenting a terrorist offence as necessary and justified is a criminal offence.<sup>33</sup> A specific intent is required to incite the commission of a terrorist offence. The provocation must in addition be committed unlawfully and intentionally.

Recruitment for terrorism is also a criminal offence if a person is solicited “to commit or participate in a commission of a terrorist offence, or to join an association or group, for the purpose of contributing to the commission of one or more terrorist offences by the association or the group” (Article 6). The recruitment for terrorism may be carried out through the use of Internet, but it is required that the recruiter successfully approach the person. The recruitment must be unlawfully and intentionally.

Training for terrorism is a criminal offence if instructions are provided for “making or use of explosives, firearms or other weapons or noxious or hazardous substances, or in other specific methods or techniques” (Article 7). The purpose must be to execute the terrorist offence or contribute to it. The trainer must have knowledge of that skills or “know-how” and intended to be used for the carrying out of the terrorist offence or for a contribution to it.<sup>34</sup> The training must be unlawfully and intentionally.

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<sup>32</sup> See <http://conventions.coe.int>

<sup>33</sup> See Explanatory Report note 98.

<sup>34</sup> See Explanatory Report note 122.

Public provocation, recruitment or training for a coordinated cyber attack with terrorist intent to destroy or seriously disrupt information technology systems or networks of vital importance to the society may constitute as a criminal offence.

In one of the first convictions of this category, a man was on April 11, 2007, sentenced in København Byret (Copenhagen District Court)<sup>35</sup> in Denmark, to imprisonment for 3 year and 6 months for a violation of Danish Penal Code. He had encouraged to terrorist acts by collecting materials of previous terrorists' acts and other terrorists material. His acts were not even connected to any specific terrorist acts. The court stated also as follows:

*The defendants activity may be described as professional general advices to terrorist groups that are intended to commit terrorist acts and that the defendant knew that, including that the spreading of his materials were suitable for recruiting new members to the groups, and suitable for the members of the groups to be strengthened in their intent to commit terrorist acts.*

Attorney Generals or General Prosecutors from 30 European States made a statement at the Ninth Annual Eurojustice Conference in September 2006 as follows:<sup>36</sup>

*All countries are struggling to adapt their criminal justice systems to the threat posed by terrorism. However, combating terrorism is fundamental in order to guarantee the security and freedom of all citizens. However, the fight against terrorism should not be seen as a "war". Terrorism must be regarded as a crime, albeit a particularly serious one, and should be commanded as such. Preventive measures, investigation, prosecution and trial must be founded on the rule of law, be under judicial control and based on the international recognized human rights principles as enshrined in the United Nations Human Rights Conventions and the European Convention on Human Rights.*

#### 4) Judicial Courts

##### National Courts:

The national Court of Justices is the main legal guarantee on promoting the national rule of law on criminal conducts in cyberspace. The role of judges in protecting the rule of law and human rights in the context of terrorism in cyberspace should apply also on all categories of cybercrime. The Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) has adopted in 2006 the following principles:<sup>37</sup>

*While terrorism creates a special situation justifying temporary and specific measures that limit certain rights because of the exceptional danger it poses, these measures must be determined by the law, be necessary and be proportionate to the aims of a democratic society.*

*Terrorism cases should not be referred to special courts or heard under conditions that infringe individual rights to a fair trial.*

*The courts should, at all stages of investigations, ensure that restrictions of individual rights are limited to those strictly necessary for the protection of the interests of society, reject evidence obtained under torture or through inhuman or degrading treatment and be able to refuse other evidence obtained illegally.*

*Detention measures must be provided for by law and be subject to judicial supervision, and judges should declare unlawful any detention measure that are secret, unlimited in duration or do not involve appearance before established according to the law, and make sure that those detained are not subjected to torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment.*

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<sup>35</sup> See [www.domstol.dk/KobenhavnsByret](http://www.domstol.dk/KobenhavnsByret)

<sup>36</sup> See [www.euro-justice.com](http://www.euro-justice.com)

<sup>37</sup> Adopted November 11, 2006 by the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE). CCJE is a Council of Europe advisory body. See [www.coe.int/ccje](http://www.coe.int/ccje)



*Judges must also ensure that a balance is struck between the need to protect the witnesses and victims of acts of terrorism and the rights of those charged with the relevant offences.*

*While States may take administrative measures to prevent acts of terrorism, a balance must be struck between the obligation to protect people against terrorist acts and the obligation to safeguard human rights, in particular through effective access to judicial review of the administrative measures*

#### The International Criminal Court:

The International Criminal Court was established in 1998 by 120 States, at a conference in Rome. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted and it entered into force on July 1st, 2002.<sup>38</sup>

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is the first ever permanent, treaty based, fully independent international criminal court established to promote the rule of law and ensure that the gravest international crimes do not go unpunished. The Court do not replace national courts, the jurisdiction is only complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. It will investigate and prosecute if a State, party to the Rome Statute, is unwilling or unable to prosecute. Anyone, who commits any of the crimes under the Statute, will be liable for prosecution by the Court.

The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is limited to States that becomes Parties to the Rome Statute, but then the States are obliged to cooperate fully in the investigation and prosecution.

Article 5 limits the jurisdiction to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. This may also be understood as an umbrella for future developments.<sup>39</sup> The article describes the jurisdiction including crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression.

In the final diplomatic conference in Rome,<sup>40</sup> other serious crimes such as terrorism crimes were discussed, but the conference regretted that no generally acceptable definition could be agreed upon. The conference recognized that terrorist acts are serious crimes of concern to the international community, and recommended that a review conference pursuant to the article 123 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court consider such crimes with the view of their inclusion in the list within the jurisdiction of the Court.

#### Article 4

The individual countries in each region around the world are members of the United Nations. In addition, most of the countries are also members of regional organizations within their region. But there is no “umbrella” organization or institution only for the regional organizations. Regional organizations may also want to exchange information on common problems and find relevant solutions on many issues of mutual and global concern. A global forum for international or regional organizations and relevant private industry should be established. The regional organizations have also recognized that a dialog between the organizations and relevant private companies is important. With regard to cybersecurity and cybercrime, the purpose would be to discuss, exchange information and approach a common understanding or coordination on principles and standards for the global combat against cybercrime. That includes massive and coordinated cyber attacks against countries

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<sup>38</sup> See [www.icc-cpi.int/about/ataglance/history.html](http://www.icc-cpi.int/about/ataglance/history.html)

<sup>39</sup> See [www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99\\_corr/2.htm](http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99_corr/2.htm)

<sup>40</sup> Final Act of the United Nations diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome July 17, 1998 (U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10)

critical information infrastructure, and against terrorists misuse of the Internet. The regional organizations may then be able to assist and make guidelines for their member countries within the regional traditions.

Several regional organizations have been identified, and at least 12 organizations are of relevance for reaching a common understanding and coordination on principles and standards for the global combat against cybercrime. These are, but not limited to: G 8 Group of States, Council of Europe, Organization of American States (OAS), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), The League of Arab States, African Union, The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), The Commonwealth, European Union, Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), NATO, and The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

In addition, global organizations such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), INTERPOL and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) should share partnerships with the organizations. Such a group may then be called the O-15 Group of Organizations.

A conference may promote regional and global research and development on cybersecurity and cybercrime. The strategy for solutions will unite the existing regional initiatives, and bring the organizations together with the goal of proposing global solutions.

#### Article 5

Three principle sources of these fundamental individual rights are the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976), and the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950).

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 19 reads as follows:

*“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”*

*The Convention on Cybercrime* Article 15 addresses the requirements for safeguards on individual rights and provides categories where procedural protections are most necessary.

The establishment, implementation and application of the powers and procedures provided for in the section on procedural law require the States to provide for the adequate protection of human rights and liberties. Some common standards or minimum safeguards are required, including the international human rights instruments. The principle of proportionality shall be incorporated. The power or procedure shall be proportional to the nature and circumstances of the offence. Each State shall also consider the impact of the powers and procedures in this section upon the rights, responsibilities and legitimate interests of third parties.

#### Article 6

With regard to the need for regulation on Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), discussions at the HLEG included an expert opinion as follows:<sup>41</sup>

*A danger is that as information (including voice) becomes exclusively transmitted as data, and the information naturally migrates to IP systems, regulatory controls are left behind. In creating new policies and regulations, legislatures must consider the kind of information being sent rather than the mechanism by which it is sent,*

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<sup>41</sup> See Graham Butler: ITU Global Strategic Report 1.7.8, page 48 (2008)

*especially where the transmission of human voice is concerned. The problems arising from unregulated VoIP are far reaching.*

*The need for regulation can be categorized into two general areas, 1) revenue collection - through taxes, fees and rates needed to maintain and grow a sustainable communications infrastructure, and 2) public safety - that is, the ability to guarantee 24/7 access to emergency services, and law enforcements ability to track, trace, intercept and interpret communications used for criminal activity over any network.*

*Governments and Regulators also face an even more menacing concern where VoIP is concerned; ensuring public safety. VoIP providers may decide not to offer emergency-service access because they do not wish to expend the money and resources. As a result, people may not know that the VoIP phone they are using is not connected to the emergency-service-access system, which could create potentially fatal problems in a crisis.*

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*Allowing illegal VoIP traffic benefits no one. There can be no doubt that healthy 21st century economies necessitate an advanced openly available and affordable telecommunications infrastructure, which can be maintained, upgraded and expanded, while providing for the public good.*

## THE CHAIRMAN'S MODEL LAW ON CYBERCRIME LEGISLATION

An example for a Model Law, called The Chairman 's Model Law, is provided for in Appendix 1.

The basic principle is making a model law on cybercrime legislation that is based on a potential for consensus.

Provisions on attempt, aiding or abetting should be enacted and implemented in accordance with the individual countries own legal system and practice and need not necessarily be included in a convention. Similar approach should be taken with regard to corporate liability, and punishable sanctions and measures for criminal offences.

General principles relating to mutual assistance as described in the Convention on Cybercrime Articles 26-35 are included in the assistance that Interpol may offer to their member countries, and do not need to be included in a Convention. Especially for the transborder access to stored computer data with consent or where publicly available, as described in Articles 32, must be based on consensus by each country. Some countries do not accept such principles, and must be respected for their opinions. With regard to the 24/7 Network, as described in Article 35, is not needed in a Convention. Both Interpol and the G8 countries offers a 24/7 network. The G8 24/7 network is offered to countries outside member countries, and includes today more than 40 countries.

The Chairman's Model Law on Cybercrime Legislation may then be described as a kind of "Convention of Cybercrime Light", but includes developments after 2001 such as terrorist use/misuse of Internet, identity theft/infringements, and preparatory conducts prior to attempted acts.

The most important problem today is that the 2001 Cybercrime Convention, like other treaties, is not dynamic. The Convention is based on criminal cyber conducts in the late 1990s. New methods of conducts in cyberspace with criminal intent must be covered by criminal law, such as phishing, botnets, spam, identity theft, virtual world offences, terrorist use of Internet, etc. Many countries have adopted or preparing for new laws covering some of those conducts. In addition, the terminology included in the Convention is a 1990s terminology, and do not necessary be suitable for the 2010s.

It is time for a discussion on a global protocol on cybercrime. And the Chairman's Model Law may then only be a basis for such developments, adding proposals for new cybercrime legislations as the cyberspace technology develops into new non-accepted conducts.

## APPENDIX 1

### The Chairmans Model Law on Cybercrime Legislation

#### CHAPTER 1 – SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW

#### IMPLEMENT AT LEAST THE CONVENTION ON CYBERCRIME ARTICLES 2-9 IN THE SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW SECTION:

##### Article 1 – Definitions

For the purposes of this Convention:

- a "computer system" means any device or a group of interconnected or related devices, one or more of which, pursuant to a program, performs automatic processing of data;
- b "computer data" means any representation of facts, information or concepts in a form suitable for processing in a computer system, including a program suitable to cause a computer system to perform a function;
- c "service provider" means:
  - i any public or private entity that provides to users of its service the ability to communicate by means of a computer system, and
  - ii any other entity that processes or stores computer data on behalf of such communication service or users of such service;
- d "traffic data" means any computer data relating to a communication by means of a computer system, generated by a computer system that formed a part in the chain of communication, indicating the communication's origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service.

##### Section 1 – Substantive criminal law

###### *Title 1 – Offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems*

##### Article 2 – Illegal access

Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right. A Party may require that the offence be committed by infringing security

measures, with the intent of obtaining computer data or other dishonest intent, or in relation to a computer system that is connected to another computer system.

### **Article 3 – Illegal interception**

Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the interception without right, made by technical means, of non-public transmissions of computer data to, from or within a computer system, including electromagnetic emissions from a computer system carrying such computer data. A Party may require that the offence be committed with dishonest intent, or in relation to a computer system that is connected to another computer system.

### **Article 4 – Data interference**

- 1 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the damaging, deletion, deterioration, alteration or suppression of computer data without right.
- 2 A Party may reserve the right to require that the conduct described in paragraph 1 result in serious harm.

### **Article 5 – System interference**

Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the serious hindering without right of the functioning of a computer system by inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering or suppressing computer data.

### **Article 6 – Misuse of devices**

- 1 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally and without right:
  - a the production, sale, procurement for use, import, distribution or otherwise making available of:
    - i a device, including a computer program, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of committing any of the offences established in accordance with the above Articles 2 through 5;
    - ii a computer password, access code, or similar data by which the whole or any part of a computer system is capable of being accessed,

with intent that it be used for the purpose of committing any of the offences established in Articles 2 through 5; and

- b the possession of an item referred to in paragraphs a.i or ii above, with intent that it be used for the purpose of committing any of the offences established in Articles 2 through 5. A Party may require by law that a number of such items be possessed before criminal liability attaches.
- 2 This article shall not be interpreted as imposing criminal liability where the production, sale, procurement for use, import, distribution or otherwise making available or possession referred to in paragraph 1 of this article is not for the purpose of committing an offence established in accordance with Articles 2 through 5 of this Convention, such as for the authorised testing or protection of a computer system.
  - 3 Each Party may reserve the right not to apply paragraph 1 of this article, provided that the reservation does not concern the sale, distribution or otherwise making available of the items referred to in paragraph 1 a.ii of this article.

### *Title 2 – Computer-related offences*

#### **Article 7 – Computer-related forgery**

Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally and without right, the input, alteration, deletion, or suppression of computer data, resulting in inauthentic data with the intent that it be considered or acted upon for legal purposes as if it were authentic, regardless whether or not the data is directly readable and intelligible. A Party may require an intent to defraud, or similar dishonest intent, before criminal liability attaches.

#### **Article 8 – Computer-related fraud**

Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally and without right, the causing of a loss of property to another person by:

- a any input, alteration, deletion or suppression of computer data;
- b any interference with the functioning of a computer system,

with fraudulent or dishonest intent of procuring, without right, an economic benefit for oneself or for another person.

### *Title 3 – Content-related offences*

#### **Article 9 – Offences related to child pornography**

- 1 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally and without right, the following conduct:
  - a producing child pornography for the purpose of its distribution through a computer system;

- b offering or making available child pornography through a computer system;
  - c distributing or transmitting child pornography through a computer system;
  - d procuring child pornography through a computer system for oneself or for another person;
  - e possessing child pornography in a computer system or on a computer-data storage medium.
- 2 For the purpose of paragraph 1 above, the term “child pornography” shall include pornographic material that visually depicts:
- a a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct;
  - b a person appearing to be a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct;
  - c realistic images representing a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.
- 3 For the purpose of paragraph 2 above, the term “minor” shall include all persons under 18 years of age. A Party may, however, require a lower age-limit, which shall be not less than 16 years.
- 4 Each Party may reserve the right not to apply, in whole or in part, paragraphs 1, sub-paragraphs d. and e, and 2, sub-paragraphs b. and c.



## CHAPTER 2 – PROSEDURAL LAW

Establish the procedural tools necessary to investigate and prosecute such crimes as described in Convention on Cybercrime Articles 14-22 in the section on procedural law, and Articles 23-25 on international cooperation:

### *Title 1 – Common provisions*

#### **Article 14 – Scope of procedural provisions**

- 1 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish the powers and procedures provided for in this section for the purpose of specific criminal investigations or proceedings.
- 2 Except as specifically provided otherwise in Article 21, each Party shall apply the powers and procedures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article to:
  - a the criminal offences established in accordance with Articles 2 through 11 of this Convention;
  - b other criminal offences committed by means of a computer system; and
  - c the collection of evidence in electronic form of a criminal offence.
- 3
  - a Each Party may reserve the right to apply the measures referred to in Article 20 only to offences or categories of offences specified in the reservation, provided that the range of such offences or categories of offences is not more restricted than the range of offences to which it applies the measures referred to in Article 21. Each Party shall consider restricting such a reservation to enable the broadest application of the measure referred to in Article 20.
  - b Where a Party, due to limitations in its legislation in force at the time of the adoption of the present Convention, is not able to apply the measures referred to in Articles 20 and 21 to communications being transmitted within a computer system of a service provider, which system:
    - i is being operated for the benefit of a closed group of users, and
    - ii does not employ public communications networks and is not connected with another computer system, whether public or private,that Party may reserve the right not to apply these measures to such communications. Each Party shall consider restricting such a reservation to enable the broadest application of the measures referred to in Articles 20 and 21.

#### **Article 15 – Conditions and safeguards**

- 1 Each Party shall ensure that the establishment, implementation and application of the powers and procedures provided for in this Section are subject to conditions and safeguards provided for under its domestic law, which shall provide for the adequate protection of human rights and liberties, including rights arising

pursuant to obligations it has undertaken under the 1950 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 1966 United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other applicable international human rights instruments, and which shall incorporate the principle of proportionality.

- 2 Such conditions and safeguards shall, as appropriate in view of the nature of the procedure or power concerned, *inter alia*, include judicial or other independent supervision, grounds justifying application, and limitation of the scope and the duration of such power or procedure.
- 3 To the extent that it is consistent with the public interest, in particular the sound administration of justice, each Party shall consider the impact of the powers and procedures in this section upon the rights, responsibilities and legitimate interests of third parties.

#### *Title 2 – Expedited preservation of stored computer data*

##### **Article 16 – Expedited preservation of stored computer data**

- 1 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to enable its competent authorities to order or similarly obtain the expeditious preservation of specified computer data, including traffic data, that has been stored by means of a computer system, in particular where there are grounds to believe that the computer data is particularly vulnerable to loss or modification.
- 2 Where a Party gives effect to paragraph 1 above by means of an order to a person to preserve specified stored computer data in the person's possession or control, the Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to oblige that person to preserve and maintain the integrity of that computer data for a period of time as long as necessary, up to a maximum of ninety days, to enable the competent authorities to seek its disclosure. A Party may provide for such an order to be subsequently renewed.
- 3 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to oblige the custodian or other person who is to preserve the computer data to keep confidential the undertaking of such procedures for the period of time provided for by its domestic law.
- 4 The powers and procedures referred to in this article shall be subject to Articles 14 and 15.

##### **Article 17 – Expedited preservation and partial disclosure of traffic data**

- 1 Each Party shall adopt, in respect of traffic data that is to be preserved under Article 16, such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to:
  - a ensure that such expeditious preservation of traffic data is available regardless of whether one or more service providers were involved in the transmission of that communication; and

- b ensure the expeditious disclosure to the Party's competent authority, or a person designated by that authority, of a sufficient amount of traffic data to enable the Party to identify the service providers and the path through which the communication was transmitted.
- 2 The powers and procedures referred to in this article shall be subject to Articles 14 and 15.

*Title 3 – Production order*

**Article 18 – Production order**

- 1 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to empower its competent authorities to order:
- a a person in its territory to submit specified computer data in that person's possession or control, which is stored in a computer system or a computer-data storage medium; and
  - b a service provider offering its services in the territory of the Party to submit subscriber information relating to such services in that service provider's possession or control.
- 2 The powers and procedures referred to in this article shall be subject to Articles 14 and 15.
- 3 For the purpose of this article, the term "subscriber information" means any information contained in the form of computer data or any other form that is held by a service provider, relating to subscribers of its services other than traffic or content data and by which can be established:
- a the type of communication service used, the technical provisions taken thereto and the period of service;
  - b the subscriber's identity, postal or geographic address, telephone and other access number, billing and payment information, available on the basis of the service agreement or arrangement;
  - c any other information on the site of the installation of communication equipment, available on the basis of the service agreement or arrangement.

*Title 4 – Search and seizure of stored computer data*

**Article 19 – Search and seizure of stored computer data**

- 1 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to empower its competent authorities to search or similarly access:
  - a a computer system or part of it and computer data stored therein; and
  - b a computer-data storage medium in which computer data may be stored in its territory.
- 2 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that where its authorities search or similarly access a specific computer system or part of it, pursuant to paragraph 1.a, and have grounds to believe that the data sought is stored in another computer system or part of it in its territory, and such data is lawfully accessible from or available to the initial system, the authorities shall be able to expeditiously extend the search or similar accessing to the other system.
- 3 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to empower its competent authorities to seize or similarly secure computer data accessed according to paragraphs 1 or 2. These measures shall include the power to:
  - a seize or similarly secure a computer system or part of it or a computer-data storage medium;
  - b make and retain a copy of those computer data;
  - c maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;
  - d render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer system.
- 4 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to empower its competent authorities to order any person who has knowledge about the functioning of the computer system or measures applied to protect the computer data therein to provide, as is reasonable, the necessary information, to enable the undertaking of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2.
- 5 The powers and procedures referred to in this article shall be subject to Articles 14 and 15.

*Title 5 – Real-time collection of computer data*

**Article 20 – Real-time collection of traffic data**

- 1 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to empower its competent authorities to:

- a collect or record through the application of technical means on the territory of that Party, and
- b compel a service provider, within its existing technical capability:
  - i to collect or record through the application of technical means on the territory of that Party; or
  - ii to co-operate and assist the competent authorities in the collection or recording of,

traffic data, in real-time, associated with specified communications in its territory transmitted by means of a computer system.

2 Where a Party, due to the established principles of its domestic legal system, cannot adopt the measures referred to in paragraph 1.a, it may instead adopt legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure the real-time collection or recording of traffic data associated with specified communications transmitted in its territory, through the application of technical means on that territory.

3 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to oblige a service provider to keep confidential the fact of the execution of any power provided for in this article and any information relating to it.

4 The powers and procedures referred to in this article shall be subject to Articles 14 and 15.

**Article 21 – Interception of content data**

1 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary, in relation to a range of serious offences to be determined by domestic law, to empower its competent authorities to:

- a collect or record through the application of technical means on the territory of that Party, and
- b compel a service provider, within its existing technical capability:
  - i to collect or record through the application of technical means on the territory of that Party, or
  - ii to co-operate and assist the competent authorities in the collection or recording of,

content data, in real-time, of specified communications in its territory transmitted by means of a computer system.

2 Where a Party, due to the established principles of its domestic legal system, cannot adopt the measures referred to in paragraph 1.a, it may instead adopt legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure the real-time

collection or recording of content data on specified communications in its territory through the application of technical means on that territory.

- 3 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to oblige a service provider to keep confidential the fact of the execution of any power provided for in this article and any information relating to it.
- 4 The powers and procedures referred to in this article shall be subject to Articles 14 and 15.

### **Section 3 – Jurisdiction**

#### **Article 22 – Jurisdiction**

- 1 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish jurisdiction over any offence established in accordance with Articles 2 through 11 of this Convention, when the offence is committed:
  - a in its territory; or
  - b on board a ship flying the flag of that Party; or
  - c on board an aircraft registered under the laws of that Party; or
  - d by one of its nationals, if the offence is punishable under criminal law where it was committed or if the offence is committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of any State.
- 2 Each Party may reserve the right not to apply or to apply only in specific cases or conditions the jurisdiction rules laid down in paragraphs 1.b through 1.d of this article or any part thereof.
- 3 Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish jurisdiction over the offences referred to in Article 24, paragraph 1, of this Convention, in cases where an alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him or her to another Party, solely on the basis of his or her nationality, after a request for extradition.
- 4 This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised by a Party in accordance with its domestic law.
- 5 When more than one Party claims jurisdiction over an alleged offence established in accordance with this Convention, the Parties involved shall, where appropriate, consult with a view to determining the most appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution.

## **Article 23 – General principles relating to international co-operation**

The Parties shall co-operate with each other, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, and through the application of relevant international instruments on international co-operation in criminal matters, arrangements agreed on the basis of uniform or reciprocal legislation, and domestic laws, to the widest extent possible for the purposes of investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offences related to computer systems and data, or for the collection of evidence in electronic form of a criminal offence.

### *Title 2 – Principles relating to extradition*

## **Article 24 – Extradition**

- 1 a This article applies to extradition between Parties for the criminal offences established in accordance with Articles 2 through 11 of this Convention, provided that they are punishable under the laws of both Parties concerned by deprivation of liberty for a maximum period of at least one year, or by a more severe penalty.
- b Where a different minimum penalty is to be applied under an arrangement agreed on the basis of uniform or reciprocal legislation or an extradition treaty, including the European Convention on Extradition (ETS No. 24), applicable between two or more parties, the minimum penalty provided for under such arrangement or treaty shall apply.
- 2 The criminal offences described in paragraph 1 of this article shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between or among the Parties. The Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty to be concluded between or among them.
- 3 If a Party that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another Party with which it does not have an extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition with respect to any criminal offence referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.
- 4 Parties that do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognise the criminal offences referred to in paragraph 1 of this article as extraditable offences between themselves.
- 5 Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the law of the requested Party or by applicable extradition treaties, including the grounds on which the requested Party may refuse extradition.
- 6 If extradition for a criminal offence referred to in paragraph 1 of this article is refused solely on the basis of the nationality of the person sought, or because the requested Party deems that it has jurisdiction over the offence, the requested Party shall submit the case at the request of the requesting Party to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution and shall report the final outcome to the requesting Party in due course. Those authorities shall take their decision and

conduct their investigations and proceedings in the same manner as for any other offence of a comparable nature under the law of that Party.

- 7 a Each Party shall, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, communicate to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe the name and address of each authority responsible for making or receiving requests for extradition or provisional arrest in the absence of a treaty.
- b The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall set up and keep updated a register of authorities so designated by the Parties. Each Party shall ensure that the details held on the register are correct at all times.

*Title 3 – General principles relating to mutual assistance*

**Article 25 – General principles relating to mutual assistance**

- 1 The Parties shall afford one another mutual assistance to the widest extent possible for the purpose of investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offences related to computer systems and data, or for the collection of evidence in electronic form of a criminal offence.
- 2 Each Party shall also adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to carry out the obligations set forth in Articles 27 through 35.
- 3 Each Party may, in urgent circumstances, make requests for mutual assistance or communications related thereto by expedited means of communication, including fax or e-mail, to the extent that such means provide appropriate levels of security and authentication (including the use of encryption, where necessary), with formal confirmation to follow, where required by the requested Party. The requested Party shall accept and respond to the request by any such expedited means of communication.
- 4 Except as otherwise specifically provided in articles in this chapter, mutual assistance shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the law of the requested Party or by applicable mutual assistance treaties, including the grounds on which the requested Party may refuse co-operation. The requested Party shall not exercise the right to refuse mutual assistance in relation to the offences referred to in Articles 2 through 11 solely on the ground that the request concerns an offence which it considers a fiscal offence.
- 5 Where, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, the requested Party is permitted to make mutual assistance conditional upon the existence of dual criminality, that condition shall be deemed fulfilled, irrespective of whether its laws place the offence within the same category of offence or denominate the offence by the same terminology as the requesting Party, if the conduct underlying the offence for which assistance is sought is a criminal offence under its laws.



## **CHAPTER 4 – PREVENTION OF TERRORISM**

Implement the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism Articles 5-7

### **Article 5 – Public provocation to commit a terrorist offence**

- 1 For the purposes of this Convention, "public provocation to commit a terrorist offence" means the distribution, or otherwise making available, of a message to the public, with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist offence, where such conduct, whether or not directly advocating terrorist offences, causes a danger that one or more such offences may be committed.
- 2 Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, as defined in paragraph 1, when committed unlawfully and intentionally, as a criminal offence under its domestic law.

### **Article 6 – Recruitment for terrorism**

- 1 For the purposes of this Convention, "recruitment for terrorism" means to solicit another person to commit or participate in the commission of a terrorist offence, or to join an association or group, for the purpose of contributing to the commission of one or more terrorist offences by the association or the group.
- 2 Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish recruitment for terrorism, as defined in paragraph 1, when committed unlawfully and intentionally, as a criminal offence under its domestic law.

### **Article 7 – Training for terrorism**

- 1 For the purposes of this Convention, "training for terrorism" means to provide instruction in the making or use of explosives, firearms or other weapons or noxious or hazardous substances, or in other specific methods or techniques, for the purpose of carrying out or contributing to the commission of a terrorist offence, knowing that the skills provided are intended to be used for this purpose.
- 2 Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish training for terrorism, as defined in paragraph 1, when committed unlawfully and intentionally, as a criminal offence under its domestic law.

## CHAPTER 5 – OTHER CYBERCRIME LEGISLATION

### Recommended Identity Theft or Identity Infringements Legislation

#### Alternatives:

U.S. Penal Code § 1028 (a)(7) adopted in 1998, amended in 2004, and reads as follows:

*“Whoever, in a circumstance described in subsection (c) of this section-*

*(7) knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, or in connection with, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a felony under any applicable, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.*

In Europe, the new Penal Code in Norway (2009) has in § 202 a provision on Identity Infringements, and reads as follows (unauthorised translation):

*“With a fine or imprisonment not exceeding 2 years shall whoever be punished, that without authority possesses of a means of identity of another, or acts with the identity of another or with an identity that easily may be confused with the identity of another person, with the intent of*

- a) procuring an economic benefit for oneself or for another person, or*
- b) causing a loss of property or inconvenience to another person.”*

## APPENDIX 2

### REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF HLEG

The HLEG members were in broad agreement on many recommendations for legal measures, although not a full consensus on all recommendations. Comments from some HLEG members on these recommendations are included as follows: <sup>42</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> See [www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca](http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca)

## 1. Work Area I (WA1): Legal Measures

### Overview:

Work Area one (WA1) sought to promote cooperation and provide strategic advice to the ITU Secretary-General on legislative responses to address evolving legal issues in cybersecurity. Some HLEG members considered that the scope of WA1 included prosecution of cybercrimes. One member suggested the following summary of WA1: "ITU's Secretary-General should promote cooperation among the different actors so that effective legal instruments are identified and characterized in building confidence and security in the use of ICTs, making effective use of ITU recommendations and other standards, in accordance with present international agreements".

### Summary of Discussions:

*Discussions covered how to build on existing agreements in this area: for example, the Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime and the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism of 2005. Some members preferred omitting mention of the Convention on Cybercrime, although they recognized it as an available reference. One member stated that the Convention on Cybercrime could not be proposed as the only solution for all states and wished to acknowledge the status of the Convention as an example of legal measures realized as a regional initiative belonging to signatory countries, consistent with the status accorded to the Convention in paragraph 40 of the WSIS Tunis Agenda for the Information Society.*

*There was considerable discussion as to whether recommendations 1.1-1.3 should be merged. Some members supported the suggestion that Recommendations 1.1-1.3 should be merged (e.g. some members wished to delete Recommendation 1.3). One key recommendation emerging from WA1 was that ITU could organize a global conference to promote cybersecurity, but this was contentious for some HLEG members (recommendation 1.13).*

### 1. WA1 Recommendations:

1.1. ITU is a leading organisation of the UN system and could elaborate strategies for the development of model cybercrime legislation as guidelines that are globally applicable and interoperable with existing national and regional legislative measures.

1.2. Governments should cooperate with other stakeholders to develop necessary legislation for the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime, noting existing frameworks: for example, UNGA Resolutions 55/63 and 56/121 on "Combating the criminal misuse of information technologies" and regional relevant initiatives including, but not limited to, the Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime.

1.3. Considering the Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime as an example of legal measures realized as a regional initiative, countries should complete its ratification, or consider the possibility of acceding to the Convention of Cybercrime. Other countries should, or may want to, use the Convention as a guideline, or as a reference for developing their internal legislation, by implementing the standards and principles it contains, in accordance with their own legal system and practice.

*With regard to the Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime, some members suggested that countries could be encouraged to join and ratify the Convention and draw on it in drafting their relevant legislation. One member suggested that countries could, or may want to, use the Convention as a guideline, or as a reference for developing their internal legislation, by implementing the standards and principles it contains, in accordance with their own legal system and practice. Other members preferred omitting mention of the Convention on Cybercrime, although they recognized it as an available reference, whilst one member stated that the*

*Convention could not be proposed as the only solution for all states and wished to acknowledge that the Convention is an example of legal measures realized as a regional initiative belonging to those countries which are signatories, consistent with the status accorded to the Convention in paragraph 40 of the WSIS Tunis Agenda for the Information Society. Some members wished to delete recommendation 1.3, despite the insertion of text recognizing the Convention as a regional initiative. One member wished to delete the phrase "may want to" in recommendation 1.3.*

1.4. It is very important to implement at least Articles 2-9 in the substantive criminal law section, and to establish the procedural tools necessary to investigate and prosecute such crimes as described in Articles 14-22 in the section on procedural law.

A few members wished to delete this recommendation.

1.5. Cybercrime legislation should be designed using existing international and regional frameworks as a reference or as a guideline, and the Convention on Cybercrime was designed in a way so that it could be adapted to technological developments, and laws using the Convention as a guideline should be able to address modern developments.

*One member wished to delete the first phrase on how cybercrime legislation should be developed. A few other members wished to delete the text referring to the history of the design of the Convention and the normative statement as to what it might be able to achieve.*

1.6. Discussions about how to address criminal activities related to online games have just begun. Currently, most states seem to focus on extending the application of existing provisions, instead of developing a new legal framework for activities in virtual worlds. Depending on the status of cybercrime-related legislation, most offences should be covered this way; otherwise, countries should consider an appropriate approach to cover such offences.

*One member wished to delete this Recommendation.*

1.7. Supplementing Articles in the Convention may however be necessary. Countries should especially consider legislation efforts against spam, identity theft, criminalization of preparatory acts prior to attempted acts, and massive and coordinated cyber attacks against the operation of critical information infrastructure.

*A few members wished to delete the first sentence referring to the need for supplementing Articles in the Convention.*

1.8. Countries should consider how to address data espionage and steps to prevent pornography being made available to minors.

*One member considered that the term "data espionage" is ambiguous, and should be defined properly, whilst another member wished to remove this term. Two members wished to delete this recommendation.*

1.9. The introduction of new technologies always presents an initial challenge for law enforcement. For example, VoIP and other new technologies may be a challenge for law enforcement in the future. It is important that law enforcement, government, the VoIP industry and ICT community consider ways to work together to ensure that law enforcement has the tools it needs to protect the public from criminal activity.

1.9.(a) Given the responsibility of government authorities in protecting their consumers, special attention should be given to requirements enacted by government authorities that bear directly on

the infrastructure-based and operational requirements imposed on those who provide and operate network infrastructures and services, or supply the equipment and software, or end-users. The concept of shared responsibilities and responsible partnership should be underscored in the development of legal measures on cybersecurity obligations in civil matters. A coordinated approach between all parties is necessary to develop agreements, as well as provide civil remedies in the form of judicial orders for action or monetary compensation instituted by legal systems when harm occurs.

*Two members wished to delete this recommendation. Some members wished to replace the specific references to VoIP with more general text recognizing that the introduction of a broad range of new technologies presents initial challenges for law enforcement. One member supported reference to “government, industry and ICT community”, whilst another wished to make more general reference to “all relevant parties” [who] “should work together to ensure that law enforcement has the tools, resources and training needed”. One member proposed the specific insertion of the additional text in 1.9(a).*

1.10. The implementation of a data retention approach is one approach to avoid the difficulties of getting access to traffic data before they are deleted, and countries should carefully consider adopting such procedural legislation.

*Two members wished to delete this recommendation. Another member proposed the alternative text: “the implementation of a data preservation approach has proven to be a key resource to law enforcement in investigations. Development of a balanced and reasonable data retention requirement should be carefully examined, taking into account expectations of privacy, security risks, etc., when considering adopting such procedural legislation”.*

1.11. In the fight against terrorist misuse of the Internet and related ICTs, countries should complete their ratification of the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism of 2005. Other countries should, or may want to, use the Convention as a guideline, or as a reference for developing their internal legislation, by implementing the standards and principles it contains, in accordance with their own legal system and practice. Article 5 on public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, Article 6 on recruitment for terrorism, and Article 7 on training for terrorism are especially important. In addition, the Convention on Cybercrime has been studied with relation to terrorist misuse of the Internet and has been found to be important for defense against it.

*One member wished to delete the last sentence.*

1.12. Given the ever-changing nature of ICTs, it is challenging for law enforcement in most parts of the world to keep up with criminals in their constant efforts to exploit technology for personal and illegal gains. With this in mind, it is critical that police work closely with government and other elements of the criminal justice system, Interpol and other international organizations, the public at large, the private sector and non-governmental organizations to ensure the most comprehensive approach to addressing the problem.

*General consensus was achieved in respect of this recommendation.*

1.13. There are several challenges facing prosecutors today in order to successfully prosecute cybercrime cases. These challenges include: 1) implementation of relevant cybercrime legislation; 2) understanding the technical evidence; 3) collecting evidence abroad; and 4) being able to extradite suspects located abroad. Thus, international coordination and cooperation are necessary in prosecuting cybercrime and require innovation by international organizations and governments, in order to meet this serious challenge. The Convention on Cybercrime Articles 23-25 address basic requirements for international cooperation in cybercrime cases.

*One member wished to delete the last sentence, while several other members wished to extend the reference to the Articles mentioned, with the replacement of Article 25 with 35.*

1.14. In conducting cybercrime investigation and prosecution, countries should ensure that their procedural elements include measures that preserve the fundamental rights to privacy and human rights, consistent with their obligations under international human rights law. Preventive measures, investigation, prosecution and trial must be based on the rule of law, and be under judicial control.

*General consensus was achieved in respect of this recommendation.*

1.15. The ITU, as the sole Facilitator for WSIS Action Line C5, should organize a global conference with the participation of [ITU Membership] for Members, regional and [international] organizations on cybersecurity and [relevant private organizations] in cybercrime. Participating organizations include, but are not limited to: INTERPOL, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), G 8 Group of States, Council of Europe, Organization of American States (OAS), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), The Arab League, The African Union, The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), The Commonwealth, European Union, Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), NATO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

*Many members supported the recommendation of a global conference to promote cybersecurity, whilst other members wished to remove this recommendation – one member voiced its strong opposition to this. One member emphasized that ITU conferences should be open in its membership, especially to developing countries, whilst another underlined the importance of ITU remaining open to collaboration. Several members included reference to ITU’s mandate as Facilitator for WSIS Action Line C5 and proposed insertions in square brackets refining the scope of the stakeholders involved.*

As the Chairman of the HLEG it is my sincere hope that the basis for a global framework on cybersecurity and cybercrime is in place. Some of the HLEG member comments are included, and some are not. But a Global Protocol on cybersecurity and cybercrime should be a continuous process until a reasonable result is achieved.

## INVENTORY OF RELEVANT INSTRUMENTS:

1. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: [www.unodc.org](http://www.unodc.org)
2. Council of Europe: [www.conventions.coe.int](http://www.conventions.coe.int)
3. G8 Group of States: [www.g7.utoronto.ca](http://www.g7.utoronto.ca)
4. European Union: [www.europa.eu](http://www.europa.eu) or [www.ec.europa.eu](http://www.ec.europa.eu)
5. Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC): [www.apectelwg.org](http://www.apectelwg.org)
6. Organization of American States: [www.oas.org/juridico/english/cyber.htm](http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/cyber.htm)
7. The Commonwealth: [www.thecommonwealth.org](http://www.thecommonwealth.org)
8. Association of South Asian Nations (ASEAN): [www.aseansec.org](http://www.aseansec.org)
9. Organization of Economic Cooperation (OECD): [www.oecd.org](http://www.oecd.org)
10. The Arab League: [www.arableagueonline.org](http://www.arableagueonline.org)
11. The African Union: [www.africa-union.org](http://www.africa-union.org)
12. OECD: [www.oecd.org](http://www.oecd.org)
13. NATO: [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int)
14. Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) [www.sectsco.org](http://www.sectsco.org)